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The Debate on the Uselessness of Western Studies
Abstract: In 1902, Mori O¯gai and Anesaki Cho¯fu¯ briefl y engaged in a public 
debate on the importance of study abroad and Western learning in general. 
Cho¯fu¯ was cautionary about Japan following foolishly in the steps of Germany; 
O¯gai countered with the argument that the West (and Germany in particular) 
offered intellectual riches as long as the Japanese student chose his subjects 
carefully. Neither man “won” the debate, but their arguments reveal how Ger-
man philosophy infl uenced modern Japan and how variably that philosophy 
was interpreted.
The Meiji Japanese experience abroad varied not only across temporal di-
vides but also in accordance with an individual’s training, expectations, and 
goals. The opportunities to study abroad were initially fairly limited in the 
1860s and early 1870s, but they more than quadrupled by the turn of the 
century. At fi rst, the majority of Japanese sent overseas were expected to 
study the natural sciences (including medicine), the social sciences (law, 
political science, military science, education, etc.), and industry.1 Although 
these areas of inquiry remained popular throughout the Meiji period, by 
the 1900s some scholars also focused on the humanities (philosophy or 
literature, for example). The sponsors of Japanese studying abroad like-
wise varied with the times: in the bakumatsu period, one’s han was the 
most likely sponsor, but immediately after the Restoration, sponsors tended 
to be government ministries and the military. By the end of the Meiji pe-
riod, private organizations, both educational and philanthropic, joined the 
ranks of overseas-study benefactors. One might fi nd any sort of continu-
ity or similarity in this sea of variables surprising, yet for some of those 
1. For a breakdown of areas of study, see Tezuka Akira, ed., Bakumatsu Meiji kaigai 
toko¯sha so¯ran (Tokyo: Kashiwa Shobo¯, 1992).
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 participating in study abroad, notably Mori O¯gai2 (1862–1922) and Anesaki 
Cho¯fu¯3 (1873–1949), the experience qua experience became a point of uni-
fying discourse.
O¯gai studied medicine in Germany from 1884 to 1888, sponsored by the 
Ministry of War. He divided his time between Leipzig, Berlin, and Munich. 
Upon his return to Japan, he pursued a military career and also an illustri-
ous career as a prominent author of both fi ction and nonfi ction. By most 
accounts, O¯gai’s experience in Germany was positive; it was a time of com-
parative goodwill between Japan and Germany, and O¯gai was treated well 
by his German hosts. The Sino-Japanese War was still a few years away, and 
Japan was a relative newcomer to the international community. O¯gai’s main 
objective was to study public hygiene, and he was greatly impressed with 
the advances in public health he found in Germany. He became determined 
to bring those scientifi c advancements back to Japan. O¯gai also became very 
interested in German literature and philosophy, particularly the aesthetic 
ideas of Eduard Hartmann (1842–1906). In the years following his stint 
abroad, O¯gai translated some of Hartmann’s treatises into Japanese and be-
came a minor fi gure in intellectual debates on aesthetics in Japan. But really, 
for O¯gai, Germany was a land of science and technological advancement.
Cho¯fu¯ studied religion in Germany from 1900 to 1903, sponsored by 
the Ministry of Education. His time was divided between Kiel, Berlin, and 
Leipzig. After returning to Japan, he became a professor of philosophy at 
Tokyo Imperial University and began what would be a highly respected 
career in the fi eld of comparative religions. Cho¯fu¯’s experience in Germany 
was in sum negative; although he became good friends with his academic 
mentor, Paul Deussen, and was able to progress in his studies, the national 
situation in Germany made his stay unpleasant. Between O¯gai’s departure 
and Cho¯fu¯’s arrival, Kaiser Wilhelm II had taken power and begun his cam-
paign against the “yellow peril” (as he referred to East Asians). In addition 
to the political unrest which caused Cho¯fu¯ to fear for his well-being at times, 
another source of discontent for Cho¯fu¯ was disillusionment with Protestant-
ism. He had no interest in the scientifi c advancements that had captured 
O¯gai’s attention; rather, he was in search of the spirituality that drove the 
West. Before arriving in Germany, he was convinced that Lutheranism 
must be the driving force behind Germany’s success, but after seeing how 
Wilhelm used religion as a political tool, Cho¯fu¯ turned away from all forms 
of Protestantism, labeling them as misguided.4
2. O¯gai was his pen name; his given name was Rintaro¯.
3. Cho¯fu¯ was his pen name; his given name was Masaharu.
4. Cho¯fu¯ did not dismiss Christianity in its entirety. Years later, in 1908, he traveled to 
Italy to learn more about St. Francis of Assisi, fi nding many parallels between St. Francis 
and the Japanese Pure Land saint, Ho¯nen. See Anesaki Cho¯fu¯, Hanatsumi nikki (Tokyo: 
Hakubunkan, 1909).
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Although O¯gai was not ready to accept all things German without 
question, in balance he felt that Germany—at least the Germany of the 
1880s—had much to offer Japan. Cho¯fu¯, on the other hand, turned his focus 
to France and Italy, essentially leaving German studies behind for good. 
Why should we compare these two seemingly unconnected scholars? The 
two engaged in a brief exchange about their experiences in Germany, and 
through that exchange revealed two unique perspectives on study abroad 
and Western studies by Meiji Japanese, topics often treated as undifferenti-
ated entities.
Scholarly Debates at the Turn of the Century
Let us begin our consideration by looking at Cho¯fu¯’s initial complaint 
about Germany and O¯gai’s interpretation of it.
When I was still in Japan and learned of the European civilization only 
through books, I looked upon it with secret wonder. My greatest wish in 
crossing the seas to visit this country [Germany] was to acquaint myself 
with its civilization, and draw from it some spiritual gain.5 But there are 
few in Europe who possess an understanding of philosophy. The great po-
ets are not the vagabonds one sees on the trains in Germany. In particular, 
the world of German thought in the late nineteenth century was akin to 
the declining Man’yo¯ age. The brilliant French culture of the eighteenth 
century had moved the German spirit, and the early nineteenth century 
was the classic age of philosophy and letters. But after the irresistible force 
of thought and literary production had overfl owed into the spiritual world, 
now we fi nd ourselves in the next age where there are no geniuses, where 
there are no great minds of production besides those who simply embellish 
and ornament what has come before. [Anesaki Cho¯fu¯]
In the latest issue of the Taiyo¯, I read an open letter addressed by Mr. 
Anesaki [Cho¯fu¯] now studying in Berlin to Mr. Takayama [Chogyu¯]. Mr. 
Anesaki seems aggrieved, fi nding his study abroad hardly meaningful. He 
states that the only benefi t he has gained is his discovery of defects of [the] 
German nation. He says the fundamentals of German culture and religion 
are of little value. And it seems there are not a few intellectuals in Tokyo 
who approve his opinion. This should be interpreted that they consider 
study abroad futile.6 [Mori O¯gai]
The fi rst quotation above comes from an open letter, titled “Takayama 
Chogyu¯ ni kotauru sho”7 (An answer to Takayama Chogyu¯), which Anesaki 
5. The fi rst two sentences here are translated by Hirakawa Sukehiro in “Changing Jap-
anese Attitudes toward Western Learning” (Part 2), Contemporary Japan, Vol. 28, No. 4 
(1967), p. 791. Unless noted otherwise, all translations in this article are my own.
6. Passage translated by Hirakawa in ibid., p. 789.
7. The title, “Takayama Chogyu¯ ni kotauru sho,” refers to an earlier letter on aesthetics 
by Chogyu¯, also published in Taiyo¯ and part of the biteki seikatsu ron (aesthetic life debate). 
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Cho¯fu¯ published serially in the February and March 1902 issues of the 
magazine Taiyo¯. The letter was ostensibly addressed to the editor of Taiyo¯ 
(and Cho¯fu¯’s close friend), Takayama Chogyu¯8 (1871–1902). The second 
quotation comes from a speech given by Mori O¯gai to the troops in Kokura, 
titled “Yo¯gaku no seisui o ronzu” (On the vicissitudes of Western studies). 
O¯gai had been stationed in Kokura since June 1899; he gave this speech 
on the eve of his return to Tokyo. While in Kyushu—in a post usually de-
scribed by his biographers as a kind of punishment or exile because he com-
plained too much to his superiors and “insisted too much on modern views 
of medicine that were diffi cult if not impossible for older offi cers trained 
in traditional methods to grasp”9—O¯gai kept current on debates and events 
in the intellectual circles of the capital, and one of the major outlets for 
such information was Taiyo¯. O¯gai’s speech was a direct response to Cho¯fu¯’s 
letter.
Although O¯gai and Cho¯fu¯ were ostensibly discussing the study-abroad 
experience, to a certain extent they were talking past each other. Cho¯fu¯ 
was critiquing German culture; O¯gai was advocating studying German 
civilization and gleaning what one could from it. It was not that O¯gai will-
fully misunderstood Cho¯fu¯, really. Rather, O¯gai was using Cho¯fu¯’s letter 
as an opportunity to continue a series of other debates on aesthetics, de-
bates that involved Cho¯fu¯, Tsubouchi Sho¯yo¯ (1859–1935), and Takayama 
Chogyu¯. In order to understand O¯gai’s response to Cho¯fu¯, then, one must 
fi rst trace the main scholarly relationships between these four men that 
led to it.
Chronologically, the debates began with an exchange between O¯gai and 
Sho¯yo¯ in 1891–92 on the terms “objective” and “subjective,” incorporating 
the ideas of Hartmann, whom O¯gai had studied extensively, and the syn-
thesis of English literature which had informed Sho¯yo¯’s Sho¯setsu shinzui 
in 1885.10 The debate does not lend itself to quick summary; in their de-
pendence on two different literary traditions (German and British), the two 
men invariably ended up in areas that did not compare easily. Sho¯yo¯, as 
in Sho¯setsu shinzui, held that literature should be based on real, objective 
experience. O¯gai agreed with this but with the Hartmann caveat that there 
was an “absolute beauty” that could “invest the particular with a higher 
truth.”11 What is important about this debate for our purposes is that it put 
This letter was reprinted in Takayama Chogyu¯, Saito¯ Nonohito, Anesaki Cho¯fu¯, Tobari Chi-
kufu¯ shu¯, Vol. 40 of Meiji bungaku zenshu¯, ed. Senuma Shigeki (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobo¯, 
1965), pp. 210–20. All page numbers for this letter refer to this edition.
8. Chogyu¯ was his pen name; his given name was Rinjiro¯.
9. J. Thomas Rimer, Mori O¯gai (Boston: Twayne Publishers, 1975), p. 27.
10. See R. Petralia, “Nietzsche in Meiji Japan: Culture Criticism, Individualism and 
Reaction in the ‘Aesthetic Life’ Debate of 1901–1903” (Ph.D. diss., Washington University, 
1981), pp. 404–5. Tsubouchi Sho¯yo¯, Sho¯setsu shinzui (Tokyo: Sho¯getsudo¯, 1885).
11. Rimer, Mori O¯gai, p. 55.
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aesthetics as a scholarly area of inquiry front and center in the Japanese 
literary world.
A decade later, in 1901–3, there was another exchange of ideas known 
as the biteki seikatsu ron (aesthetic life debate). This was a broad academic 
debate among many scholars—chiefl y Chogyu¯ and the writer Tsubouchi 
Sho¯yo¯—and has been thoroughly discussed elsewhere.12 But again, for our 
purposes, it was signifi cant because Chogyu¯ advocated an aesthetic life 
based on the individual’s senses and Sho¯yo¯ advocated a rational, objective 
approach. The juxtaposition of “objective” and “subjective” thus reappeared, 
Sho¯yo¯ advocating the objective and Chogyu¯ advocating the  subjective. Ul-
timately, this dichotomy was at the heart of what Cho¯fu¯ found problematic 
in Germany.
Cho¯fu¯, O¯gai, and Chogyu¯ all traveled in the same intellectual circles. 
Cho¯fu¯ had been marginally involved in the biteki seikatsu ron through his 
close friendship with Chogyu¯; Chogyu¯ had published a number of essays 
in the late 1890s on aesthetics, including “Rekishi gadai ron” (Essay on 
the subject of historical paintings).13 And, Chogyu¯ began teaching aesthet-
ics at Tokyo Imperial University in 1898. Chogyu¯ was thus a professional 
aesthetician; the university asked him in 1900 to go to Europe to further his 
studies of aesthetics, but poor health prevented him from doing so. It was 
a tremendous disappointment for him, made all the more sad when Cho¯fu¯ 
was sent to Germany on a Ministry of Education scholarship the same year. 
Although Cho¯fu¯’s objective in Germany was to study religion, he may have 
felt some obligation to include aesthetics in his focus as a consolation to 
Chogyu¯. Because Cho¯fu¯ had gone to Germany when Chogyu¯ could not, and 
Cho¯fu¯ wrote about aesthetics in the journal Chogyu¯ edited, O¯gai may have 
viewed Cho¯fu¯ as a proxy for Chogyu¯. Cho¯fu¯ admired Chogyu¯ greatly; he 
complimented him in his letters and edited the compendium of Chogyu¯’s 
works shortly after his untimely death in December of 1902.14
Chogyu¯ was primarily drawn to aesthetics, but his interests were 
broad and his pen sharp. Before Cho¯fu¯’s departure for Europe, Chogyu¯ 
had taken advantage of his editorial clout in three articles taking O¯gai to 
task for his philosophical and aesthetic ideas, particularly his interpretation 
of  Hartmann.15 Later Chogyu¯ continued his attacks in articles on O¯gai’s 
12. See Petralia, “Nietzsche in Meiji Japan,” pp. 520–742.
13. See Watanabe Kazuyasu, “The Aesthetician Takayama Chogyu¯,” in Michael F. 
Marra, ed., A History of Modern Japanese Aesthetics (Honolulu: University of Hawai‘i Press, 
2001), pp. 115–22.
14. Chogyu¯ himself was slated to study abroad at the same time as Cho¯fu¯, but shortly 
before his departure he coughed up blood and was thus kept home for medical reasons. His 
illness turned out to be tuberculosis, which was the cause of his death only months after the 
events depicted here.
15. See “O¯gai ni kotau” (June 1896), “O¯gai to Harutoman” (August 1896), and “O¯gai no 
iwayuru chu¯sho¯ riso¯shugi” (August 1896), in Taiyo¯.
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translation of Hartmann’s Philosophie des Schönen (Philosophy of beauty, 
1887).16 Chogyu¯’s criticism in these articles was that O¯gai did not represent 
Hartmann’s ideas well in his translation (of Hartmann) and that he oversim-
plifi ed those ideas in an infelicitous fashion. The friction between Chogyu¯ 
and O¯gai seems to have been partly based on what they published but exac-
erbated by a growing stubbornness in each to listen to the other.
This jousting through the media all made for a heady atmosphere be-
tween Chogyu¯ and O¯gai. The former had established himself as one of the 
major voices in the relatively new fi eld of aesthetics and often wrote acerbic 
and opinionated commentary in Taiyo¯, but he had never studied abroad. The 
latter was a highly respected man of letters known for his tenacity. He was 
also a veteran of studying abroad and had had a very positive experience 
in Europe. O¯gai openly criticized Chogyu¯ in a newspaper article in 1900, 
expressing his disdain that “all of heaven and earth have fallen under the 
sway of Taiyo¯”17 and that Chogyu¯ unfairly received accolades from the li-
terati of Japan. Thus, when Cho¯fu¯ wrote his open letter “Takayama Chogyu¯ 
ni kotauru sho” to Chogyu¯ complaining bitterly about his own experiences 
in Germany, O¯gai sat up and took notice.
The Specifi c Exchange between Cho¯fu¯ and O¯gai
Such an atmosphere led up to what O¯gai, in his speech in Kokura, called 
the yo¯gaku muyo¯ron (debate on the uselessness of Western studies). It was, 
perhaps, unfair of O¯gai to do so because Cho¯fu¯ did not at any point say this. 
The “debate” was brief: Cho¯fu¯’s fi rst letter in Taiyo¯, dated in December 
1901, was published serially in the February and March 1902 issues. O¯gai 
responded with his speech on March 24, 1902, delivered to the Japanese 
troops in Kokura. Shortly thereafter, Cho¯fu¯ published three more letters 
titled together as “Takayama-kun ni okuru” in the March and April issues of 
Taiyo¯. Finally, a collection of letters titled “Futatabi Chogyu¯ ni atauru sho” 
(Again, letters for Chogyu¯) appeared in the August 1902 issue of Taiyo¯, but 
the letters were dated May 14, May 17, and May 18, 1902, respectively, and 
were accompanied by introductory remarks by Chogyu¯. So, although I call 
the exchange of ideas between Cho¯fu¯ and O¯gai a “debate,” I should note that 
this was a debate with only two volleys.
Many scholars make passing mention of the yo¯gaku muyo¯ron, in part 
16. Chogyu¯’s attacks were directed specifi cally at the parts titled “Der Begriff des 
Schönen” and “Das Dasein des Schönen” which O¯gai published under the title Shinbi ko¯ryo¯ 
(Tokyo: Shun’yo¯do¯, 1899). Chogyu¯’s articles were “‘Shinbi ko¯ryo¯’ o hyo¯su,” Tetsugaku zasshi, 
August 1899, and “Hihyo¯: ‘Shinbi ko¯ryo¯’ o hyo¯su,” Teikoku bungaku, August 1899.
17. From O¯gai’s essay, “O¯gai gyoshi to wa tare zo?” translated by J. Thomas Rimer 
as “Who Is O¯gai Gyoshi?” in J. Thomas Rimer, ed., Not a Song Like Any Other (Honolulu: 
University of Hawai‘i Press, 2004), p. 8.
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because Cho¯fu¯ is seen as challenging the authority of O¯gai, his senior and 
one who was well respected among his peers.18 Another cause of notoriety 
was that O¯gai took the liberty of paraphrasing Cho¯fu¯ as saying that study 
abroad and Western studies were useless, a rather controversial statement 
at the turn of the century when hundreds of Japanese were headed abroad, 
particularly to Germany, which was considered to be at the forefront of the 
sciences, including military science.19 That said, what was at issue was not 
really the usefulness of study abroad. The debate was about two tangen-
tial topics: fi rst, the benefi ts of adopting certain aspects of Western culture 
and technology, and, second, the role of religion and philosophy in Japan’s 
quest for modernization. O¯gai was a strong proponent of Western science, 
particularly in the fi eld of medicine, and by extension he also took interest 
in philosophical views that were empirical and “objective.”
On the other side of the coin, Cho¯fu¯ focused (unsurprisingly, given 
his position as a scholar of comparative religions) on the current form that 
Christianity—specifi cally Lutheranism—took in Germany and how detri-
mental he saw it to be on a broader, global scale. We cannot easily place 
one man in a “traditionalist” camp and the other in a “progressive” camp 
because each chose from old and new traditions to suit his world outlook, 
and the suggestions they made about study abroad were informed by those 
choices. In a nutshell, Cho¯fu¯ embraced the views of Arthur Schopenhauer 
(1788–1860) and to some extent those of Friedrich Nietzsche (1844–1900), 
and O¯gai rejected them in favor of a scientifi c approach. How they expressed 
these positions and how their opinions in the letters and the Kokura speech 
represent their respective stances is detailed below.
Finally, I hasten to note that O¯gai’s speech title, “Yo¯gaku no seisui o 
ronzu,” implied that the topic was Western studies in general, including all 
the countries of Europe and North America. However, Cho¯fu¯’s original let-
ters were specifi cally aimed at Germany, and O¯gai’s response to Cho¯fu¯ was 
equally limited to defending the adaptation of German culture and learn-
ing. O¯gai did not study abroad in other countries and thus addressed Ger-
many as representative of yo¯gaku; after his bitter experiences in Germany, 
18. See, for example, Donald Keene in Dawn to the West, Vol. 2 (New York: Henry Holt, 
1984), p. 533: “when Takayama Chogyu¯’s planned trip to Europe had been canceled because 
of his illness, his friend Anesaki Masaharu, perhaps to console him, had published an article 
asserting that study abroad was of no use to a Japanese, but this view was clearly not shared 
by the many people who attended the farewell banquet for [Shimamura] Ho¯getsu” (who was 
awarded a fellowship in 1902 to study aesthetics in Europe).
19. Bakumatsu Meiji kaigai toko¯sha so¯ran indicates that 289 Japanese went abroad to 
study in 1899 (115 to Germany), 328 in 1900 (106 to Germany), and 289 in 1901 (105 to Ger-
many). Even accounting for some discrepancy in the data, we can surmise that in any given 
year around the turn of the century at least one-third of those Japanese studying abroad went 
to Germany.
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Cho¯fu¯ later traveled throughout Europe, apparently in search of the spiritu-
ally enlightened civilization he failed to fi nd in Germany. This point alone 
refutes much of what O¯gai interprets as Cho¯fu¯’s stance. In other words, 
O¯gai accused Cho¯fu¯ of rejecting yo¯gaku, but Cho¯fu¯ was simply rejecting 
Germany.
Germany for Cho¯fu¯: A Religious Land
O¯gai’s response to Cho¯fu¯ has been examined by Hirakawa Sukehiro,20 
who himself admits that he is more of an O¯gai scholar than a Cho¯fu¯ scholar. 
Hayashi Masako has also examined the German infl uences on Cho¯fu¯, 
Chogyu¯, and O¯gai, particularly as displayed in Taiyo¯ articles by the former 
two. Yet the heart of why Cho¯fu¯ disliked Germany and wrote his screed 
to Chogyu¯ has not been the main subject of any singular scholarly work. 
Certainly, as Hirakawa notes, Cho¯fu¯ arrived in Germany at a particularly 
infelicitous time. Kaiser Wilhelm II, in his infamous “Hunnenrede” speech 
on July 27, 1900, responding to the murder of the German envoy in China, 
said the Chinese would be given no quarter. Japanese were lumped by some 
Germans into the category of “East Asians” and thus were guilty by as-
sociation. Cho¯fu¯ had arrived in Germany but one month earlier to study 
with Paul Deussen (1845–1919) at the University of Kiel. Although later he 
wrote fondly in his autobiography of his friendship with Deussen and his 
family, the letter Cho¯fu¯ wrote to Chogyu¯ for publication in Taiyo¯ tells us 
that his other experiences in Germany were less pleasant.21 He writes that 
children threw stones at him in the street, inspired by the Kaiser’s rhetoric 
against the “yellow peril,” and that German culture had fallen into a horrid 
state, much worse than he had ever imagined. The Germans, he wrote, were 
barbaric and slavish to the Kaiser. Even Chogyu¯, who was not one to shy 
away from his own rhetoric, sought (in a subsequent issue of Taiyo¯) to gently 
correct some of Cho¯fu¯’s anger.22 Was it simply the Kaiser who caused this 
anger? Did Mori O¯gai really understand what it was about Germany that 
made Cho¯fu¯ so unhappy?
We can begin to answer these questions by considering Cho¯fu¯’s context: 
he was one of 33 students chosen by the Ministry of Education to travel 
abroad in 1900 to further his education.23 Having graduated from Tokyo 
20. Hirakawa Sukehiro, “Mori O¯gai no ‘Yo¯gaku no seisui o ronzu’ o megutte; seiyo¯ 
bunka to no ‘de ai no shinri’ no ichi kenkyu¯,” Hikaku bunka kenkyu¯ kiyo¯, No. 6 (1965), 
pp. 315–70.
21. See Anesaki Masaharu, Waga sho¯gai: Anesaki Masaharu sensei no gyo¯seki (Tokyo: 
O¯zorasha, 1993), pp. 82–88.
22. See Hirakawa, “Mori O¯gai no ‘Yo¯gaku no seisui o ronzu’ o megutte,” p. 337.
23. Of the 33 students that year, only Cho¯fu¯ is listed in the Bakumatsu Meiji kaigai 
toko¯sha so¯ran as studying “Religion.” Between 1868 and 1912, the Ministry of Education 
sponsored more than 800 students to study abroad in various fi elds. Of those, 37 came from 
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Imperial University and entered graduate school, he tells us in his autobi-
ography that he was unsure when or under whose auspices he would study 
abroad, but he remained sure the experience would take place. In 1900 he 
was 27 years old and a promising young scholar who was a personal favorite 
of the prominent professor of philosophy Inoue Tetsujiro¯ (1855–1944).24 As 
he notes, traveling abroad was expected of him and his peers, and in his 
generation “study abroad” (yo¯ko¯) more often than not meant study in the 
West.25 As a student Cho¯fu¯ had had many German professors, not only of 
foreign letters but also of history and philosophy. At Tokyo Imperial Uni-
versity, among the foreign academics, the largest group was the Germans, 
who comprised 38 per cent of the foreign faculty at the university during 
the Meiji period.26 In philosophy, Cho¯fu¯ studied with Raphael von Koeber 
(1848–1923), who lived and taught in Tokyo from 1893 to 1914. Koeber 
introduced Cho¯fu¯ to the works of Schopenhauer and Friedrich Wilhelm 
Joseph von Schelling (1775–1854). Consequently, Cho¯fu¯ came to view Ger-
many as a country of intellectual inquiry. Already studying English, he also 
began to study German and to take an interest in German literature such as 
Johann Goethe’s Faust and Franz Grillparzer’s Sappho. By 1898 he com-
pleted a translation of Eduard Hartmann’s treatise Die Religion des Geistes 
(The religion of the spirit)27 as well as a translation of Der Buddhismus, 
seine Dogmen, Geschichte und Literatur (Buddhism: its dogmas, history, 
and literature, 1860) by Vasili Pavlovich Vasilév (1818–1900).28 He also had 
written articles on Schopenhauer and Schelling, for Tetsugaku zasshi and 
Rikugo¯ zasshi, respectively.
Indeed, it would seem that before Cho¯fu¯ left for Germany he was 
fairly well read in the German philosophers. In addition to Schelling, 
 Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, and Hartmann, he had also studied Johann Gott-
lieb Fichte (1762–1814), Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831), and 
Max Müller (1823–1900). When he wrote in his open letter in 1902 that 
the Philosophy Department at Tokyo Imperial University, of which 6 specifi cally focused on 
religious studies (shu¯kyo¯ kankei) as opposed to the humanities ( jinbunkei). If we examine 
the students who studied abroad during the bakumatsu and Meiji periods, regardless of prov-
enance and sponsorship, we fi nd 240 in religious studies. By comparison, about four times as 
many (just over 1,000) studied medicine, as O¯gai did.
24. Cho¯fu¯ had married Inoue’s niece, Masu, in February 1898, at Inoue’s suggestion.
25. Anesaki, Waga sho¯gai, p. 76.
26. See James R. Bartholomew, “Japanese Modernization and the Imperial Universities, 
1876–1920,” Journal of Asian Studies, Vol. 37, No. 2 (1978), p. 263.
27. The translation was fi rst published serially as Shu¯kyo¯ tetsugaku in Tetsugaku zasshi
beginning in 1896 and later published as a single volume in 1898 by Hakubunkan.
28. This serialized translation appeared in To¯yo¯ tetsugaku between March and Decem-
ber 1896. Two more sections appeared in the same periodical in February and August 1897. 
For a complete listing of volumes and numbers, see Anesaki, Waga sho¯gai, p. 94. Vasilév 
was a Russian Sinologist.
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“the early nineteenth century was the classic age of philosophy and letters” 
but that “now we fi nd ourselves in the next age where there are no geniuses, 
where there are no great minds of production besides those who simply 
embellish and ornament what had come before,” he was lamenting (as we 
shall see) the eclipse of Schopenhauerian thought at the turn of the century, 
based on his extensive reading.
How exactly Cho¯fu¯ came under Paul Deussen’s tutelage is unclear but 
it is not surprising that he did so. As mentioned, Cho¯fu¯ was a student and 
nephew-in-law of Inoue Tetsujiro¯, who held the fi rst chair in philosophy at 
the imperial university. Inoue had studied in Germany—at the same time 
as O¯gai—with various important fi gures including Wilhelm Maximilian 
Wundt (1832–1920) and Hartmann. Inoue was also responsible for fi nd-
ing a position at the university for Koeber, an expert on Schopenhauer and 
Nietzsche. Presumably, Cho¯fu¯ became interested in Nietzsche and Scho-
penhauer through Inoue and Koeber, then chose to study with Deussen in 
Germany. The two were well suited to each other. Deussen was particularly 
interested in Buddhism, and, in taking Cho¯fu¯ under his wing, he gained an 
informative disciple. Deussen was a close friend of Nietzsche, but by 1900 
Nietzsche was mentally incapacitated and no longer producing philosophi-
cal works. Also, he and Deussen had grown distant once Nietzsche formally 
rejected Schopenhauer, whose thoughts Deussen continued to embrace. So, 
although Cho¯fu¯ recalls the sad day when Deussen received news of Nietz-
sche’s death, it would seem that, with Cho¯fu¯, Deussen promoted more the 
ideas of Schopenhauer than those of Nietzsche.
Cho¯fu¯ was intrigued by Schopenhauer and translated his Die Welt als 
Wille und Vorstellung (The world as will and representation, 1818) as Ishi to 
genshoku toshite no sekai (Hakubunkan, 1910–11). What was it about Scho-
penhauer that served as such an attraction? He was widely known as a pes-
simist and an atheist, neither of which describes Cho¯fu¯. But  Schopenhauer’s 
pessimism and atheism were not the negative, nihilistic attributes one might 
immediately imagine; rather, they were closely aligned with Buddhist 
ideals—at least, that was how Schopenhauer himself saw them, and we can 
speculate that this is what appealed to Cho¯fu¯. As Peter Abelsen notes:
When the tenets of Buddhism became known in Europe during the third 
and fourth decade of the nineteenth century, Arthur Schopenhauer was 
delighted with the affi nity they showed to his own philosophy. Having 
completed his main work Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung as early as 
1818, he considered it an entirely new (and thus pure) expression of the 
wisdom once taught by the Buddha—at times he even called himself a 
“Buddhaist.”29
29. Peter Abelsen, “Schopenhauer and Buddhism,” Philosophy East and West, Vol. 43, 
No. 2 (1993), p. 255. Abelsen rightly notes that Schopenhauer’s grasp of Buddhism was not 
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Specifi cally, what probably appealed to Cho¯fu¯ most was Schopenhauer’s 
rejection of monotheism and his universalist approach to the human spiritual 
experience. (Although Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung focuses on episte-
mology, Cho¯fu¯’s letter to Chogyu¯ does not address this topic.) He expected 
more Germans to have embraced those ideas; when he arrived in Germany 
and found that “there are few in Europe who possess an understanding of 
philosophy,” he was referring specifi cally to their religion, which he saw as 
the “wellspring” of civilization. He wrote to Chogyu¯ that “religion is where 
the people’s conceptual ideals are concentrated and  cultivated—it brings 
forth the entire state’s civilization.”30 In a self-deprecating tone, he wrote 
that religious studies were truly more complex than he had anticipated but 
that he would not let that hurdle prevent him from continuing his studies 
in hopes of making some semblance of individual progress. Disheartened 
by Germany’s parochialism, however, Cho¯fu¯ saw little hope for the country 
at large. Similarly, he feared for Japan’s fate should it continue to emulate 
Germany:
I am here in Germany and observing its culture, and the realities caused by 
my lamentations of daily events are similar to your shouts to the world about 
the defi ciencies in Japanese civilization. I do not speak of Germany for the 
sake of Germany; instead, I speak of German civilization for the sake of 
Japan, which has the same trends and defi ciencies in its civilization.31
In sum, Cho¯fu¯ feared that, should Japan continue to follow the German ex-
ample, it would fall into a state of cultural corruption. This state would be 
built on stagnant ideas and could not usher in a modern age. O¯gai, who had 
also studied in Germany for an extended period 15 years earlier, argued that 
Cho¯fu¯ and his sympathizers simply did not understand what technological 
advancements Germany provided. In that sense, O¯gai was right; Cho¯fu¯ did 
not attend to technology or science. It was not at the core of civilization 
for him.
Modern science, in Cho¯fu¯’s view, was a product of the age of reason and 
a slave to “objectivism,” the current idea that all of reality could be known 
objectively. This dichotomy of “objective” versus “subjective” informed the 
humanities as well as the sciences, including religious studies. Cho¯fu¯ held 
that individual spirituality could only be experienced subjectively; the ob-
jective manifestation of religion was in its organization or divisions between 
faiths. As Isomae Jun’ichi explains, “Anesaki [Cho¯fu¯] understood religion 
to be a twofold matter comprised of phenomena and essence, whereby 
each ‘developed religion’ was simply a phenomena, while the essence of 
strong, but given the nascent nature of Buddhist ideas in Europe at the time that is to be 
expected.
30. Anesaki, “Takayama Chogyu¯ ni kotauru sho,” p. 211.
31. Ibid., p. 212.
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religion was found in the religious consciousness of the individual.”32
Through this conceptualization of spirituality and religion, Cho¯fu¯ saw a 
unifying “subjective” experience (“essence”) throughout the world, regard-
less of the tradition (“phenomena”) through which it was expressed. The 
phenomena were not necessarily bad, but they could be, if they became 
political tools. Throughout his life, Cho¯fu¯ admired those charismatic reli-
gious leaders who were shunned or who shunned the “phenomena” of their 
time: Ho¯nen and Nichiren in the Buddhist tradition and St. Francis of Assisi 
in the Christian tradition. All three men rejected objective phenomena and 
embraced subjective essence. Cho¯fu¯ held that phenomena could facilitate a 
deeper essence (and had done so in human history), and before he arrived 
in Germany he thought the Protestant church, in rejecting Catholicism, had 
done just that. However, he was soon disabused of this notion.
When he arrived in Germany, expecting Protestantism to be at the center 
of German enlightenment, Cho¯fu¯ instead discovered the opposite: German 
Protestants, he wrote, “were promoting their civilization by being the bitter 
enemies of spiritual freedom, and by fi ghting spiritual independence.”33 This 
focus on the self—on the individual and how the individual experienced the 
“essence” of spirituality—was key and was what Cho¯fu¯ found lacking in 
Germany. He was unhappy to conclude that Protestantism was just that—a 
movement founded on the idea of opposition to the sacred teachings. This 
was so important to Cho¯fu¯ because it meant Protestants ignored the central-
ity of the grace of God in the individual. As he put it, Protestantism held 
that “salvation does not come from the grace of God but rather from the 
autocratic will of God, and man must submit to this. . . .  the will of God is 
everything, and man’s spirit is nothing in comparison. One’s faith does not 
bring salvation.”34 In other words, religion in Germany had been reduced to 
“phenomena,” not “essence.”
There was also a political side to religion which Cho¯fu¯ had not expected. 
Perhaps the historical relationship, or the lack thereof, between Buddhism 
and the rulership of Japan had made him imagine that religion naturally 
stood somewhat apart from government and politics. That religion could 
be used to justify political sovereignty was not a new concept in Europe—
indeed, it had been in play for centuries. But in the case of Japan, if we set 
aside the phenomenon of State Shinto¯ (admittedly an important develop-
ment in Japanese history but not a religious phenomenon by Cho¯fu¯’s defi ni-
tion), it is hard to fi nd a parallel in which Buddhism played the same sort of 
role as Christianity did throughout northern Europe or that Islam played in 
32. Isomae Jun’ichi, “The Discursive Position of Religious Studies in Japan: Masaharu 
Anesaki and the Origins of Religious Studies,” trans. Seth Jacobowitz, Method and Theory 
in the Study of Religion, Vol. 14, No. 1 (2002), p. 24.
33. Anesaki, “Takayama Chogyu¯ no kotauru sho,” p. 212.
34. Ibid.
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the Ottoman Empire. It would seem that this came as a surprise, and not a 
pleasant one, to Cho¯fu¯. He was ready to accept “God” (not denomination-
specifi c but rather the essence of spirituality in the cosmos) as the “sover-
eign of the world,” but he quickly stated, too, that God’s rule was “not an 
autocratic monarchy.” Politics should have no place in religion.35
Cho¯fu¯ said that “Protestantism does not focus in principle on the self,” 
by which he meant the essence of religion. From what he saw, Lutheranism 
had become entirely detached from the essence and was wholly focused on 
the authority of the church. By extension, the individual’s spirit was “noth-
ing” and the will of God “everything.”36 God and the church are confl ated 
in his letter, not because Cho¯fu¯ felt they were one and the same but because 
he saw the Lutherans equating the two. But whereas the Lutherans held 
the will (or wrath) of God as an iron law, Cho¯fu¯ considered it a benevolent 
force akin to parental love. This sort of compassion and sympathy was at 
the core of religious experience for Cho¯fu¯. It could be found in Pure Land 
Buddhism (the tradition into which he was born and in which he remained 
for most of his life) and in various branches of Christianity. It could even be 
found in the atheistic ideas of Schopenhauer, who, although he felt that life 
was a pointless path of suffering, held that there was a place for compassion 
nonetheless.
The disappointment Cho¯fu¯ felt upon discovering how parochial the Lu-
theran church was is palpable here and elsewhere.37 One gets the impression 
that, outside of the Deussen household (which provided, by all accounts, a 
warm, nurturing environment), Cho¯fu¯ felt betrayed and besieged by Ger-
man culture and the academy. O¯gai addresses this in a voice that verges on 
patronizing:
let me reiterate what I’ve said of the religion: although [Martin] Luther 
broke from the restrictive bonds of the Roman Catholic pope, in exchange 
he took on the fetters of an absolute monarch. That is what it is. The Prot-
estants, as their name implies, following original and conservative vestiges 
[of religious ideas], held that even if Christ’s spirit could be revived, in the 
end many evils would arise and there would be a need to combat them. The 
disillusionment of Anesaki [Cho¯fu¯] was surely caused by none other than 
his excessive hopes.38
One imagines O¯gai impatiently throwing his hands in the air as he says 
“that is what it is” (aru wa shikaran) as if to say, “what did you expect?” 
35. Ibid.
36. Ibid.
37. See Anesaki, Hanatsumi nikki, particularly the section on Rome. Also of note is 
that, according to one of his grandchildren, Cho¯fu¯ allowed his grandchildren to be baptized 
but not in a Protestant church.
38. Mori O¯gai, “Yo¯gaku no seisui o ronzu,” in Karaki Junzo¯, ed., Mori O¯gai, Vol. 27 of 
Meiji bungaku zenshu¯ (Tokyo: Chikuma Shobo¯, 1965), p. 386.
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That the Lutheran Church suffered under many of the same structural prob-
lems inherent in the Roman Catholic Church was a foregone conclusion 
for O¯gai. Given that, O¯gai chose to dedicate little time to it in his speech, 
instead focusing on the benefi ts of study abroad, namely, learning Western 
science.
Germany for O¯gai: A Scientifi c Land
In his speech to the troops at Kokura, O¯gai fi rst noted the many scien-
tifi c accomplishments of his day, including the X-ray, the steam engine, and 
wireless communications. He was also quick to point to certain failures (as 
he saw them) of Western learning, such as an increased lassitude among 
scholars, but insisted that they did not outweigh the progress that Western 
learning brought to Japan. He criticized Tsubouchi Sho¯yo¯ for saying “The 
Japanese have hitherto gone abroad taking with them no settled opinion of 
their own; so they have become enamored of the West. They must hence-
forth go abroad fortifi ed with a settled opinion, so that they may be able 
to select and obtain abroad whatever knowledge they are seeking.”39 O¯gai 
countered that this would only hold true if the Japanese scholars were su-
perior to Westerners in their knowledge—but, he contended, they are not. 
Instead, O¯gai identifi ed Japanese scholarly hubris as the root of the problem. 
In other words, if a Japanese scholar fails to fi nd the good in Western learn-
ing, then it is for lack of understanding, not necessarily objective reality. As 
an argument, it is sound but it does not directly address Cho¯fu¯’s concerns. 
Eventually, though, O¯gai turned to the specifi c complaints from Cho¯fu¯’s 
letter. The salient passage is long and best broken into sections:
Mr. Anesaki holds that the basis of academic religion in Germany today 
is inadequate and ties a thread of hope to the intertwining of the popular-
ity of Nietzscheism with the future of spirituality. When I consider the 
direction(s) of that scholarship, I cannot but feel there is reason to lament 
study in the West. Let me state what Anesaki [Cho¯fu¯]’s thesis is: Today’s 
objectivism runs wild with a sensationalist analysis of things and forgets 
the integration of a central spirituality. This pushes aside the school of 
thought that holds Wundt as representative. If people push aside this school 
of thought and metaphysically seek a synthesis of spirituality, there is no 
reason for them to be satisfi ed by the current scholarly world in Germany. 
These types of people sympathize with the worshipers of Nietzsche and 
necessarily pin their hopes on spirituality.40
Wundt was a pioneer in the fi eld of psychology. Although his work 
spanned a broad array of topics, the salient point for our purposes is that 
39. Hirakawa Sukehiro, “Changing Japanese Attitudes toward Western Learning” 
(Part 1), Contemporary Japan, Vol. 28, No. 3 (1967), p. 559.
40. O¯gai, “Yo¯gaku no seisui o ronzu,” p. 385.
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he is often credited with establishing psychology as a natural science rather 
than an area of philosophy.41 What O¯gai is saying here is that there is a sci-
entifi c approach to everything, including psychology (and, by a Wundtian 
extension, spirituality). But if Cho¯fu¯ was going to insist on rejecting science 
in the study of religion, naturally he would be disappointed. O¯gai points out:
The current European schools, which are best represented through the 
ideas of Wundt, emulate the natural sciences by using induction to inves-
tigate individual problems. They shun metaphysics or, at least, the meta-
physics that has been with us since time immemorial. I fear it would be 
diffi cult to construct a [metaphysical] view of the world that would satisfy 
the spirit of these schools.42
Not only would it be diffi cult, but, O¯gai implies, unnecessary. The scientifi c 
world provides modern man with all the answers. That traditional meta-
physics does not conform to science is evidence that it is outmoded and can 
be safely discarded.
Cho¯fu¯’s Rejection of Science
In contrast, Cho¯fu¯ saw a paradox in scholars—particularly philologists—
claiming “objectivity” in their research: by claiming that their individual 
work was supported by objective facts or reality, the scholars lost their in-
dividual claims. True scholarship could only be achieved subjectively, but 
most of the scholars in Germany at the turn of the century had left that mode 
of inquiry behind. Cho¯fu¯ deeply disliked the pretentiousness that he saw in 
the academy and associated it with this corruption of academic inquiry. He 
described his professors as pompous men who assigned useless readings of 
dry tomes and lectured in the gloomy halls of the university, never engaging 
with their students or with the world outside academia.43 German scholar-
ship, as depicted by Cho¯fu¯, was stalled in a miasma of useless genufl ection 
to authority, much in the same way that German religion was stalled in 
mindless genufl ection to the authority of the Lutheran Church.
In a subsequent letter, he further criticizes the professional scholars of 
religion and identifi es William Robertson Smith (1846–94) as accomplish-
ing what they could not:
Because Smith approached religion from a human perspective, his research 
standpoint can be called subjective. That subjective understanding resulted 
in his clear understanding of the Jewish people. But dear friend! Smith, 
41. Bernard Spilka, Ralph W. Hood Jr., Bruce Hunsberger, and Richard Gorsuch, The 
Psychology of Religion, Third Edition: An Empirical Approach (New York: Guilford Press, 
2003), p. 536.
42. Anesaki, “Takayama Chogyu¯ ni kotauru sho,” p. 211.
43. Ibid.
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this clear researcher, was not a university professor, nor a doctor, nor a 
degree holder, but a correspondent for the Times. . . .  Ah, Germany—and 
Japan, who emulates her—so-called scientifi c research in the end cannot 
supersede the work of a Times reporter!44
It is worth noting that Cho¯fu¯ was mistaken: Smith was a professor of divin-
ity and a scholar in his own right. But what is important for Cho¯fu¯ is that 
Smith was the subject of a libel suit in the Church of Scotland and eventu-
ally found guilty for having written heretical material for an article in the 
Encyclopædia Britannica, for which he was an editor. Thus, Smith had 
rejected authority. Smith argued in the article and elsewhere that written 
texts, although certainly important to the “phenomena” or manifestation 
of religious organizations in human society, were liable to mistakes, errors, 
omissions, and misinterpretations.45 He also argued that one need not em-
brace scientifi c rationalization and the denial of the supernatural in order to 
systematically study religious texts (in particular, the Bible). Smith’s career 
recovered from the suit and he lived out his life as a professor. Attacking 
the academy as such is thus a straw man, but Smith proves an interesting 
choice of hero for Cho¯fu¯ because on the one hand he championed inquiry 
into religion, yet he insisted that such inquiry need not be “rationalistic.” 
Indeed, Smith wrote,
[If] you fi nd me calling in a rationalistic principle, if you can show at any 
step in my argument that I . . . reject plain facts in the interests of ratio-
nalistic theories, I will frankly confess that I am in the wrong. But, on the 
other hand, you must remember that all truth is one, that the God who gave 
us the Bible has also given us faculties of reason and gifts of scholarship 
with which to study the Bible, and that the true meaning of Scripture is not 
to be measured by preconceived notions, but determined as the result of 
legitimate research.46
This was the Protestant world Cho¯fu¯ had dreamed of and hoped to fi nd 
in Germany, before he realized that intellectual innovation had stalled there. 
Instead of a dynamic world of inquiry, he found musty classrooms with pre-
tentious professors, all of whom claimed to be scholars involved in serious 
academic quests but whose rationalistic tendencies struck Cho¯fu¯ as false 
and invalid. He sought a synthesis, as O¯gai put it, of spirituality, but what 
he found was a dogmatic approach to religion that claimed ultimate author-
ity and superiority. In the same letter, Cho¯fu¯ disparages “science” and in 
44. Anesaki Cho¯fu¯, “Takayama-kun ni okuru,” reprinted in Takayama Chogyu¯, Saito¯ 
Nonohito, Anesaki Cho¯fu¯, Tobari Chikufu¯ shu¯, p. 224. All page numbers for this letter refer 
to this edition.
45. See William Robertson Smith, The Old Testament in the Jewish Church: A Course 
of Lectures on Biblical Criticism, 2nd ed. (London: A. and C. Black, 1892), pp. 1–20.
46. Ibid., p. 19.
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particular philology, saying that he is studying abroad in a country full of 
philologists, scholars who stand at their lecterns but fail to dig deeply into 
the wellspring of ideas upon which knowledge is founded.
Cho¯fu¯ is ruthless with his criticisms:
The vim and vigor of German learning is only that in name. This is espe-
cially true of philology, which is surpassed by none in its intricate esoteric 
doctrines. Most of the people in this world come from this society [of 
philologists], who pit letter against letter and phrase against phrase, fi nally 
spreading their anger through open letters, with such self-esteem as to im-
ply that only philology had such subtleties of inquiry. They separate them-
selves from others, demarking their own specialty and wearing a facade of 
[total] vainglory. Whatever they debate, they follow the hard and fast rules 
of their own specialty. And, if they for an instant enter the world of some-
one else’s specialty, like a Tokyo vagabond who defends his own roped-off 
turf, they become angry and fi ght. The research is uselessly detailed; the 
debates are uselessly numerous. These numerous debates have made the 
fi eld of vision and capacity of scholars become increasingly narrow and 
rigid; this is the common evil of today’s German scholars.47
Cho¯fu¯ continues in this vein, quoting the German theologian Hermann 
Schell, who criticized the pointless pursuit of trivial rubbish. Finally, he 
brings the world of irrelevant studies together with politics by equating in-
tellectual turf building by scholars with the aggressive plunder of territory 
by nation-states. His ultimate fear is that Japanese students, studying in 
Germany, were learning behaviors in the classroom that would transform 
into destructive political behaviors in the future.
In other words, Cho¯fu¯ saw German scholars—particularly philologists—
as game players of a sort: they defi ned their academic territory and then 
defended it. But the territory was nothing more than a collection of useless 
data, the result of splitting hairs. It was not a result of sincere inquiry and 
thus seemed illegitimate. Worse, this trend could easily spread to Japanese 
scholars who were training in Germany. It is hard to know exactly what set 
Cho¯fu¯ off to write this tirade, but it was likely rooted in both the debates 
he heard at the university in Kiel and perhaps also in the territorial and 
imperialistic expansion by many nations across the globe which marked the 
turn of the century—expansion that seemed void of a deeper destiny beyond 
political territorial control on the part of the conquerors.
Cho¯fu¯ on the Arts and Aesthetics
Cho¯fu¯’s concern was not limited to practices in the academy and across 
national borders. He also feared that aesthetics—the appreciation of art, the 
role of art in man’s life, the understanding of art—had withered in the mod-
47. Anesaki, “Takayama Chogyu¯ ni kotauru sho,” p. 215.
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ern age and that this withering was a bellwether, indicating that the West 
was in cultural decline. He complained that German scholars who claim to 
know Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749–1832) do so after studying irrel-
evant minutiae such as Goethe’s handwriting, his diaries, and his letters. But 
to really know Goethe, and Richard Wagner (1813–83), and Arnold Böcklin 
(1827–1901), he tells us, one had to experience and be moved by their time-
less work that spoke to the human spirit. What made them special could not 
be broken down into syntax, individual notes, or brushstroke technique. In 
describing these three artists in his letter, Cho¯fu¯ turns to Buddhist concepts 
of nirvana and purity. Let us look at each one in turn:
[Goethe] recognized and demonstrated a magnifi cent, harmonious, and 
facile spirit, one that brought order to the grand scheme of things in nature. 
He sang of the deep harmony of man’s nature. His spirit, which was not 
tainted by lust or injured by pathos, had the power to make him the great 
teacher of today’s German human spirit and to obstruct the dismantling of 
the spiritual civilization [of Germany].48
Certainly many Japanese writers admired Goethe, not the least of whom 
was Takayama Chogyu¯ who translated Die Leiden des jungen Werthers
(The sorrows of young Werther, 1774) in 1891.49 What Cho¯fu¯ fi nds notable 
in Goethe is that he captured the “German spirit” which was threatened in 
the modern world. On the frontispiece of Fukkatsu no shoko¯ (The dawn 
of restoration, 1904), Cho¯fu¯ quotes Goethe’s poem “Vermächtnis”: “Das 
Wahre war schon längst gefunden/ Hat edle Geisterschaft verbunden/ Das 
alte Wahre faß es an!” (The Truth of yore has been descried/ And noble 
spirits it allied./ To dear old Truth we must adhere!)50 In other words, old-
fashioned truth—that which came before the age of “science”—should not 
be eschewed.
On Wagner, Cho¯fu¯ writes:
From the standpoint of the arts, too, Wagner’s operas, in terms of their 
thought, their meter, their music—all opposed weak egotism and social 
formalism. . . .  Dear friend, I wrote to you all about my feelings the fi rst 
time I heard a Wagner opera. In a word, my whole body was covered with 
goose bumps and I forgot about everything else in the world. In the fi rst 
piece of Der Ring des Nibelungen, Das Rheingold, the shallow waters of 
the Rhine fl ow between the dark cliffs of the banks. From the chilling 
scene in which Alberich seizes the Rhine maidens’ gold and curses love, to 
the fi nal piece of the Ring cycle, the so-called “Song of Omnipotent Love” 
in which the heroine Brünnhilde mounts Siegfried’s horse and charges into 
48. Ibid., pp. 216–17.
49. “Eruteru no niai” was published serially in Yamagata nippo¯.
50. This translation is from Paul Carus, Goethe: With Special Consideration of His 
Philosophy (Chicago: Open Court Publishing Company, 1915), p. 244.
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the raging fl ames of his funeral pyre, the whole opera counters the strife of 
dependent greed in this world. Until the solemn end in which true love—
love which abandons desire and the self—reconciles all, there is depicted 
a boundless supply of the absolute power inside the human spirit, of the 
absolute unifying foundation. Another work tells of Tristan who hides his 
love from the world and destroys his desires; this is the gospel of the realm 
of nirvana. In the end, as when Percival appeals intuitively to the return to 
nirvana/bliss or the ultimate Christian love, Wagner is not only not a prod-
uct of today’s German civilization. He is a revolutionary genius who wants 
to overturn fundamentals and seek out a cleansing. It is no coincidence that 
Nietzsche found a peerless friend in Wagner. This genius’s revolutionary 
verse . . . brought an elixir to the spirit of the German people’s hearts and 
breathed their ideals far and wide.51
Here Cho¯fu¯ identifi es Wagner’s message as the “gospel of nirvana”—he 
means not that Wagner necessarily made this connection himself but that 
the connection was naturally there as a part of the human spirit. Further-
more, Percival enters the “ultimate Christian love,” by which he seems to 
mean a Platonic love, a concept that both Schopenhauer and Nietzsche ad-
dressed in their works. This is a love that “abandons desire and the self,” 
not a romantic or carnal love, and it follows the “absolute power inside 
the human spirit.” This power was not, however, individually empower-
ing so much as it was simply the omnipotence of all existence. The role 
of the individual here is not that of an egotistical nature but rather of a 
subjective nature. Cho¯fu¯ rejects “weak egotism” by which he means a fo-
cus on the individual self to the exclusion of a greater (spiritual) power, a 
focus that would lead to nationalism and parochialism, not the advancement 
of the individual’s soul.
At no place in this passage does Cho¯fu¯ identify specifi c musical aspects 
of the opera as moving; there is no mention of melody, movements, staging, 
direction, arias, etc. Approaching the opera in this way would be akin to 
the academic “hair-splitting” that he so detested in the German university. 
Clearly the opera moved him—made his spirit soar—and although he was 
eager to convey that experience, he did not want to do so with technical 
detail.
On Böcklin he writes:
Are not Böcklin’s paintings, in terms of their fundamental ideas and their 
colors and their poetry, revolutionary products that abolish the form and 
dry realism in the so-called German Christian civilization? . . . I have al-
ready written at length to you about Böcklin; he was born in the merchant 
town of Basel where people are always chasing after profi t (it is the place 
in Switzerland that most resembled the detestable Germans). However, his 
51. Anesaki Cho¯fu¯, “Futatabi Chogyu¯ ni atauru sho,” reprinted in Takayama Chogyu¯, 
Saito¯ Nonohito, Anesaki Cho¯fu¯, Tobari Chikufu¯ shu¯, p. 232.
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aesthetic was not suited to his birthplace and instead he took in the spirit 
of the ancient arts of distant Rome. He lent his hand to depicting the scenic 
beauty of the countryside around Munich, capturing in his paintings an 
elegance and hues that are rare in paintings these days. He conveys an ex-
ceptional artistry beyond the heavens. He portrays the depths of the human 
spirit, one that has thrown off the dirt and shackles of this transitory life. 
In the painting “Roman Woman,” the exceptional artistry of the woman 
who, in the deep, dark forest, among the fallen leaves, kneels before the 
dim altar surrounded by smoke and prays to her gods, cannot be conveyed 
ultimately in today’s dry, Semitic monotheism. [In the painting “Isle of 
the Dead”] the tall, white-robed woman boards a boat which parts the 
dark, deathly still waters of the sea and turns toward a cave, the depths 
of which seem unknown. She proceeds toward “The Isle of the Dead,” 
among the gray cliffs and darkness. In another painting, in the faint light 
of a still evening an old monk or priest with torn clothing and disheveled 
hair performs a song before the Virgin Mary, while nearby an angel lends 
his ear with one heel raised. In another painting, “Playing in the Waves,” 
he depicts odd creatures like nymphs or Pan, playing in the piercingly blue, 
bottomless waves with looks of both kindness and contempt on their faces. 
As a whole, his works warn against—or perhaps they resist or deride—
the fussy social formalism of today’s civilization. Take, for example, his 
Christ on the grave: the pure blues, the liberated expression on Christ’s 
face—ultimately, today’s bloody Christianity is not that which Christ 
taught. Böcklin resists all the aspects of today’s European civilization and 
expresses with his brush the ancient human spirit and deep colors of antiq-
uity. And, in recent years, this genius has become known in the world, in 
the end becoming worshiped as a great name to such an extent that it must 
be said that in Germany, or at least in southern Germany, he stands among 
the heavenly spirits of mankind. He is unusual in that respect. His spirit 
was active—behind all the detestable aspects of German civilization—and 
one cannot but value him.52
Cho¯fu¯ also described Böcklin’s painting “Isle of the Dead” in his 
travelogue of Italy (Hanatsumi nikki, 1909), and in a similarly laudatory 
manner. In describing paintings, he occasionally mentions technique—the 
use of color or shadow, for example—but when he does so, he quickly ties 
it in with the larger spiritual meaning of the painting. For example, here 
he tells us that the “pure blues” in the painting express liberation and the 
true teachings of Christ. In both Wagner and Böcklin, he sees a rejection 
of the modern world and suggests that a return to some primal world would 
bring us closer to the true human spirit. In Hanatsumi nikki, too, he rejects 
the Florentine painters of the Renaissance as decadent and instead focuses 
on the work of Fra Angelico (c. 1395–1455) because of its ability to express 
the true love of Christ. Cho¯fu¯ dislikes realism in paintings, associating it 
52. Anesaki, “Takayama Chogyu¯ ni kotauru no sho,” p. 217.
J5449.indb   80 1/13/11   10:14:46 AM
Fessler: Western Studies 81
with a secular view; after all, it would be impossible to depict one’s soul or 
spirit visually with any acuity.
In all these cases, Cho¯fu¯ makes an aesthetic judgment based on the 
spiritual content of the pieces, which is notable because the entire debate 
between Cho¯fu¯ and O¯gai began as a dialogue between O¯gai and Chogyu¯ on 
the topic of aesthetics. However, Cho¯fu¯’s approach to aesthetics, which was 
fi rmly rooted in the idea that art is an expression of the human spirit and 
should be judged as such, was not the same as O¯gai’s approach, which was 
technical and denied the connection between religion and art. In 1890, O¯gai 
wrote that in the modern age, visual representations of religious fi gures 
no longer held spiritual signifi cance, that “religious belief and religious art 
[had] become separated. Religious art [had] become independent of religious 
belief.”53 O¯gai translated not only Hartmann’s text Philosophie des Schönen 
but also excerpts from many other German treatises on aesthetics, such 
as Johannes Volkelt’s (1848–1940) Ästhetische Zeitfragen (Current ques-
tions on aesthetics, 1895) and Otto Liebmann’s (1840–1912) Zur Analysis 
der Wirklichkeit: Eine Erörterung der Grundprobleme der Philosophie (On 
the analysis of reality: an articulation of the basic problems of philosophy, 
1876).54 Indeed, it would be fair to say that O¯gai greatly helped introduce 
German aesthetics to Japan, but he did so largely through select transla-
tions (some excerpts, some abridgements), not through his own interpretive 
essays. O¯gai’s quest seems to have been to fi nd an analytical and scientifi c 
approach to aesthetics, which was a relatively new fi eld of inquiry.
In stark contrast is Cho¯fu¯, who produced two works of note on aesthet-
ics: a book-length work, Bi no shu¯kyo¯ (1907), which included a translation 
of Emil P. Berg’s collection of letters titled God the Beautiful: An Artist’s 
Creed (1901) as well as Cho¯fu¯’s own essays,55 and a collection of other es-
says, Fukkatsu no shoko¯. Berg’s letters closely tie art and aesthetics with 
religion; the former is the expression of the latter, or at least an expression 
of the religious consciousness of the individual. Berg’s letters are informal, 
not carefully structured academic arguments such as O¯gai was interested in 
translating. But Cho¯fu¯’s interest in them seems to have lasted for a number 
of years. Not only did he translate the volume in its entirety, he also took 
from it the strong affi liation between religion and art that became a salient 
feature in his travelogues, Hanatsumi nikki and Teiunshu¯ (1911). Fukkatsu 
53. Mori O¯gai, “Toyama Sho¯ichi shi no garon o bakusu,” trans. Mikiko Hirayama, in 
Rimer, ed., Not a Song Like Any Other, p. 111.
54. For a more complete listing of German works translated by O¯gai, see Bruno Lewin, 
“Mori O¯gai and German Aesthetics,” in Marra, ed., A History of Modern Japanese Aesthet-
ics, pp. 68–92.
55. Most bibliographies of Cho¯fu¯’s works list this as a collection of “E. P. B.’s letters” 
edited by Cho¯fu¯.
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no shoko¯, described by one scholar as a “manifesto,”56 refl ects the new 
worldview that Cho¯fu¯ developed as a result of his experiences in Germany. 
He opens the chapter on “Science and the Arts” with this paragraph:
Ultimately, science is not in any way qualifi ed to be the basic wellspring 
of man’s life. The social welfare that results from science, in most cases, is 
in inverse proportion to our spiritual needs. Such being the case, what will 
satisfy our emotion of longing, our spirits, which chase after the eternal 
light? Through art, we are able to concretize the conceptual world and 
satisfy our eternal longing. Man’s life is thus enriched; I believe art is the 
most simple, perhaps the most expedient way for us to achieve complete 
satisfaction. Consequently, without prognostication or a savior, mankind in 
the spirit of our age will achieve a deep faith in the cosmos [reality], and 
art will be the path of salvation for all peoples.57
Thus, art not only helps us concretize abstract concepts, it also presents 
a unifying path to salvation for all of mankind. By embracing art and the 
abstract in this way, Cho¯fu¯ rejects dogma and liturgy from all quarters. 
Aesthetics for him are not simply an academic branch of philosophy; art is 
holy and sacred.
Religion as a Pillar of Civilization
In sum, the state of the culture and its direction was almost always tied to 
religion for Cho¯fu¯. For O¯gai, it was tied to science. Unfortunately for Cho¯fu¯, 
religion at the turn of the century in the West had been largely dismissed 
by the academic philosophical elite. When Nietzsche famously wrote that 
“God is dead,” he meant that the role of an established God in man’s life had 
ceased to matter. Scholars instead turned to formal philosophy, dismissing 
religion as a relic of a bygone era. Moreover, Western philosophy, particu-
larly German philosophy, was strongly under the shadow of Immanuel Kant 
and G. W. F. Hegel, one that argued metaphysics and epistemology in a 
way that Japanese philosophy did not. Cho¯fu¯ was in uncharted territory in 
that sense; the Japanese tradition had not undergone the transitions that the 
European tradition did through a rejection of the Judeo-Christian doctrine 
as such and a re-exploration of metaphysics.
The closest Japan came to that experience was the relative eclipse suf-
fered by Buddhism at the hands of kokugaku (National Learning) during 
the Tokugawa and early Meiji periods. When Western philosophy was in-
troduced in the Meiji period, the fi rst wave focused on John Stuart Mill 
and Auguste Comte; and although Nishi Amane (1829–97) coined countless 
56. Fukasawa Hidetaka, “Bunka hihyo¯ to Fukkatsu no shoko¯,” in Isomae Jun’ichi and 
Fukasawa Hidetaka, Kindai Nihon ni okeru chishikijin to shu¯kyo¯: Anesaki Masaharu no 
kiseki (Tokyo: To¯kyo¯do¯ Shuppan, 2002), p. 172.
57. Anesaki Masaharu, Fukkatsu no shoko¯ (Tokyo: Hakubunkan, 1904), p. 29.
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Japanese terms in his adaptation of Western ideas, he did not seek to rec-
oncile Buddhist and Confucian concepts with the Western imports. Inoue 
Tetsujiro¯ made an attempt to reconcile Japanese traditions with German 
idealism, but as Gino Piovesana notes, he did not have “a real grasp of the 
problems he was facing in this kind of superfi cial eclecticism.”58 Nishida 
Kitaro¯ (1870–1945) is credited with coming close to blending Japanese and 
Western philosophical traditions by structuring the Japanese system on a 
Greek model, but again the gap between the two proved diffi cult to bridge 
at best.59
What we fi nd instead, at least at the turn of the century, is an academic 
landscape that did not actively seek to reconcile Buddhism with Western 
philosophy. Nor, does it seem, were many scholars interested in bringing the 
scholarly discourses into alignment.60 When Cho¯fu¯ translated Schopenhau-
er’s Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung, he used Chinese Buddhist terminol-
ogy for Schopenhauer’s philosophical terminology, such as genshiki (Skt. 
khya¯ti-vijña¯na) for Vorstellung.61 Likewise, when he traveled through Italy 
in 1908 and wrote about the many churches he saw there, he used Buddhist 
terminology for many Christian terms (such as tera for church). On the one 
hand, such use of native vocabulary for foreign concepts could be attributed 
to trying to fi nd a reader-friendly form, but in the case of the Schopenhauer 
translation it would seem he was looking very hard for a religious affi nity 
between East and West. This affi nity is also explored in various articles he 
published at the time.62
We come a little closer to what bothered Cho¯fu¯ in another passage from 
the letters which tries to clarify what he liked so much about Smith, par-
ticularly his book The Religion of the Semites (1889). Cho¯fu¯ says that Smith 
criticizes other scholars of religion for focusing on the incidentals of reli-
gions, not the core. He says other scholars of religion “up until now have 
analyzed the gods’ names, arranged their responsibilities, decided whether 
58. Gino K. Piovesana, Contemporary Japanese Philosophical Thought (New York: 
St. John’s University Press, 1969), p. 89.
59. Ibid., p. 89. Note that these efforts on Nishida’s part are dated to the 1920s, long after 
Cho¯fu¯ was in Germany.
60. A notable exception would be the Japanese study of Søren Kierkegaard. It bears 
noting, too, that some Western scholars took an interest in Asian traditions, such as Schopen-
hauer’s fascination with the Upanishads, but that interest did not translate into an effort to 
reconcile religious traditions into a coherent One.
61. In the preface, Cho¯fu¯ rationalizes his word choice, showing us that it was carefully 
considered and in opposition to other proposed translations of the time. See Ishiki to genshiki 
toshite no sekai (Tokyo: Kaizo¯sha, 1948), pp. 3–4.
62. See, for example, “Bukkyo¯shi no kenkyu¯ to Kirisuto kyo¯kaishi,” Tetsugaku zasshi, 
Vol. 106 (1895); Albert J. Edmunds, Buddhist and Christian Gospels: Being Gospel Paral-
lels from Pa¯li Texts, 3rd ed. (Tokyo: Yu¯ho¯kwan, 1905); and “How Christianity Appeals to a 
Japanese Buddhist,” Hibbert Journal, Vol. 4, No. 1 (1905).
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they were gods of the earth or gods of plentitude, etc. and thus carried out 
their research”—all of which was pointless in his view.63 Instead, he held, 
one should focus on the spiritual connection between the gods and man. The 
language Cho¯fu¯ uses in his criticism is not gentle; he accuses other scholars 
of being “corrupt” Confucianists ( fuju) and “incompetent” (shimiteki). By 
contrast, Smith’s breadth and depth were vast and he “did not become a 
slave to the material.” Smith’s insights were sharp and clear. One wonders 
how much of Cho¯fu¯’s frustration was due to a difference in writing styles. 
Certainly compared to Hegel or Kant, Smith’s writing was lucid. The Ger-
man philosophers were notorious for their oblique diction—Schopenhauer 
being the exception—and even though he was perfectly comfortable read-
ing in both German and English, it cannot have been easy for Cho¯fu¯ to read 
through Hegel. If the same sort of language found its way to the lectern and 
the classroom, then sitting through Hegel’s classes would have been a trial 
even for a dedicated scholar.
O¯gai’s response paints a very different picture. For him, German uni-
versities were bastions of reason, meritocracies that he could only hope 
would be emulated in Japan. He writes:
In Germany, a scholar’s worth is judged by his works, and a professor’s 
position, whether high or low, is in accordance with the quality or inferior-
ity of his works. I fear that our country is not yet like this. In Germany, 
scholars who are looked up to by others are those whose scholarship is 
superior. In our country, professors who have [good] scholarship are seen 
as worthless and cannot escape from being seen in the same light as those 
shrewd people who falsely gain a good reputation by occasionally produc-
ing something popular. Moreover, there are not a few well-known Japanese 
scholars who produce much scholarship while they are in Europe, but after 
returning home, although they have their own laboratories, are not able to 
produce a single thing. I fear that Japan cannot create [an academic] atmo-
sphere. Or perhaps there is no reason to create such an atmosphere within 
our country. . . .  I sincerely hope we will be able to create an academic 
atmosphere in our own country. However, we cannot say that it exists yet. 
And, if we continue in this direction, then Western learning will neces-
sarily decline and it seems to me that the self-confi dence of the Japanese 
people will never be fundamentally solidifi ed.64
How can we account for this difference in opinion between O¯gai and 
Cho¯fu¯? It probably was due to a mix of variables: differences in time, place, 
and focus of studies, as well as individual personality. Perhaps because O¯gai 
had recently been taken to task in the pages of Taiyo¯ by Takayama Chogyu¯, 
he was on the defensive. Perhaps, as Hirakawa suggests, Cho¯fu¯ was suffer-
63. Anesaki, “Takayama-kun ni okuru,” p. 224.
64. O¯gai, “Yo¯gaku no seisui o ronzu,” pp. 384–85.
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ing from homesickness and culture shock, plus lamenting that his friend 
Chogyu¯ could not join him in Europe.
It is also of note that O¯gai changed his tune a decade later in his essay 
“Mo¯so¯” (Delusion, 1911). In it, O¯gai characterizes his return from Germany 
as a somber affair, unlike that of his peers:
I was received with disappointment by my countrymen. It was not unrea-
sonable. At that time it was not a common thing to return from abroad with 
an attitude such as mine. Until then the return from foreign lands had been 
an affair of faces beaming with hope, of taking gadgets from one’s wicker 
trunk and showing some new magic for particular inspection. I was one 
who did just the opposite of this.65
But O¯gai does not mean he failed to bring back new ideas. Rather, he means 
he rejected misguided suggestions on adopting many Western forms for 
the sake of being Western and instead insisted on practicality and effi cacy. 
He was soon labeled, as he puts it, “a conservative” and, after a brief stint 
pursuing the natural sciences in the laboratory, his position in the military 
took him away from conducting research. Perhaps adding insult to injury, he 
became known more for his literary pursuits than for his skills as a physi-
cian, a cross he bore with bitterness.66
O¯gai lamented the Japanese misuse of Western ideas and technologies, 
implying that although it was good for the Japanese to adopt them, as of-
ten as not they did so superfi cially without adopting the bases upon which 
such things depended. The specifi c example he gives is that the Japanese 
did not coin a word for the German Forschung (research) (kenkyu¯, he held, 
was a poor substitute). He also cites the words of Erwin Bälz (1849–1913), 
a German scholar and physician who lived in Japan for 27 years and taught 
courses at the University of Tokyo. Bälz (as paraphrased by O¯gai) warned 
that the Japanese had adopted Western science without adopting the aca-
demic environment necessary for its sustenance. O¯gai concludes by saying, 
“Western learning, since the time of Aristotle, has attached importance to 
nature; it has never been content with the pursuit of what is only spiritual. 
In the modern age, the rise of so-called natural science has changed the 
atmosphere of the entire European academic world by one mighty sweep.”67
Here, O¯gai acknowledges that spirituality is one component of Western 
learning but not the central component—that honor was reserved for the 
sciences.
65. Translation by John Dower, “Delusion Mo¯so¯,” Monumenta Nipponica, Vol. 25, 
No. 3/4 (1970), p. 423.
66. In his essay “O¯gai gyoshi to wa tare zo?” he complains that his medical peers dis-
missed him as a doctor because he was seen primarily as a novelist instead.
67. Translation by Hirakawa Sukehiro, “Changing Japanese Attitudes toward Western 
Learning” (Part 3), Contemporary Japan, Vol. 29, No. 1 (1968), p. 155.
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What the West Had to Offer Japan and the Japanese
On the whole, then, O¯gai held that going abroad was benefi cial. The 
passage above about his return to Japan is striking in contrast to what Cho¯fu¯ 
wrote in his letter:
There are eminent professors who go abroad to spend several years in 
Western countries, just eating Western meals, having new Western-styled 
clothes made, and stacking Western books in their trunks. Upon return 
home, they introduce their civilized air to their countrymen. As for me, 
unlike them, I have realized that traveling to the West and studying abroad 
is a Pandora’s box, or a talisman that metamorphoses a human being into a 
machine. In a word, I am fortunate at having realized my own foolishness 
in having in the past placed empty hopes in such a Pandora’s box.68
So, by their own accounts, both O¯gai and Cho¯fu¯ returned from Germany 
without producing modern curiosities from their luggage. And, both men 
imply that those who did so were shallow and uncomprehending of the 
West. The difference lies in what each man did bring home. Cho¯fu¯ had 
opened a “Pandora’s box,” which here means a box of false hopes. He was 
“foolish” to expect the West to be a place where human spirituality tran-
scended the “phenomena.” Moreover, there was not a secondary discipline 
to which he could turn. He came home defeated.
O¯gai’s argument against Cho¯fu¯ runs parallel to his argument against 
the Japanese scientists of his day. Regarding the scientists, O¯gai argues that 
they misinterpreted what made German culture and civilization great and 
tried to transplant German concepts and objects that were not suited to the 
Japanese tradition. Similarly, he says that philosophers who expect to super-
impose Western concepts on Japanese traditions, particularly metaphysics, 
inevitably face disappointment. He writes:
The study of religion is similar [to the study of philosophy]; Buddhism, 
which exists in the East, and the depths of Indian philosophy which gave 
rise to it have no place in Christianity. Consequently, those who study the 
different fi elds in religious studies, likewise, go to the West and discover 
that, after all, their views are not necessarily true.69
But if this is O¯gai’s interpretation of Cho¯fu¯’s dissatisfaction, it is mistaken. 
Cho¯fu¯ did not expect the Judeo-Christian traditions to conform to Bud-
dhism; his main focus was on the human experience that transcended all 
phenomena. O¯gai argues that such a “spiritual synthesis” simply does not 
exist.
Parallel to the “spiritual synthesis” that O¯gai claims Cho¯fu¯ seeks was 
68. Translation by Hirakawa in “Changing Japanese Attitudes toward Western Learn-
ing” (Part 2), pp. 801 and 803.
69. O¯gai, “Yo¯gaku no seisui o ronzu,” p. 385.
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the idea of a universal human experience. Spirituality could take many 
forms, Cho¯fu¯ held, but these forms were invariably “subjective.” That is, the 
spiritual experience was necessarily something the individual experienced, 
not the group. That a group of people might form through a spiritual affi n-
ity was fi ne, but the group as such could not defi ne the spiritual experience. 
That Germany had become a land of chauvinism and parochial groups was 
a sure sign in Cho¯fu¯’s eyes that it was headed toward destruction. Of course, 
the bigotry against Asian people helped spur this opinion, but it was not the 
only factor; Cho¯fu¯ feared that a militaristic cause would replace a cultural 
ideal as the unifying factor in a country:
I see that no good can come of bearing arms under the banner of cultural 
implantation in the euphemism of national unity. In doing so, one cannot 
have confi dence in a cultural ideal that brings together the citizens’ spiritu-
ality, and after the war, when the military is in control, the people’s vanity 
is increased through expanding nationalism. The country is burdened with 
military preparations, and all aspects of government are entrusted to politi-
cal maneuvering without any direction or objective. I cannot but fear that 
this is what we have come to.70
In other words, unifi cation of the people was good, but it had to be brought 
about spiritually, not politically. And, organized religion (Isomae’s “phe-
nomenon”), although it could play the role of a community of individu-
ally like-minded spiritualities, too often played the role of government 
puppet.
O¯gai did not ignore German philosophy entirely, even if he criticized 
Cho¯fu¯’s interpretation of it. He had a long-standing interest in it, as was 
demonstrated by his translation of Hartmann. But that interest did not in-
dicate a dedication to a particular school or trend. In “Mo¯so¯,” O¯gai tells us 
that he rejected Hartmann’s concept of three periods of illusion but, be-
ing intrigued by certain aspects of it, read works by those who infl uenced 
Hartmann, including Max Stirner and Schopenhauer. O¯gai’s interpretation 
of Schopenhauer is strongly negative and pessimistic—Schopenhauer says 
our lives are meaningless, so there is nothing for us to do but die (in the due 
course of time). O¯gai “shakes his head” and turns away from philosophy, 
focusing on science for the remainder of his studies in Germany. Of the 
journey home, he writes:
I was not returning with only the results of a branch of natural science. 
I believed I was bringing a young plant which could be developed in the 
future. But in the homeland to which I was returning there was no atmo-
sphere to nourish this plant. At least there was none “yet.” I feared that this 
plant might wither to no purpose. Thus I was visited by a dull, gloomy, 
fatalistisch feeling.
70. Anesaki, “Takayama Chogyu¯ ni kotauru no sho,” p. 213.
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In my wicker trunk there was no philosophy whose light dispersed this 
gloomy darkness. What I had was the pessimistic philosophy of the school 
of Schopenhauer and Hartmann. This was a philosophy which made it better 
not to have than to have the phenomenal world. It was not that they did not 
recognize progress. But it was progress toward the awareness of non-being.71
The “young plant” is the natural sciences, which O¯gai felt could greatly 
benefi t his mother country if only they were properly understood and em-
ployed. Yet he had no confi dence that they would be, and thus he suffered a 
fatalistic feeling. The Germans gave him no philosophy that would counter 
this problem; for while their natural sciences progressed at the cutting edge, 
their philosophy did not address such technological advancements. Instead, 
all O¯gai had was Schopenhauer whose ideas bordered on Buddhist concepts 
of nonbeing, at least as he saw them. All of this must have caused O¯gai a 
certain amount of cognitive dissonance, for while he knew that German 
science offered great hope for mankind, he feared that German philosophy 
would undermine it.
Cho¯fu¯, on the other hand, had little interest in the natural sciences. For 
him, the threat to the future lay not in Schopenhauer (whose ideas he ad-
mired) but in the staid, stolid, and restricting form of the church and its 
liturgy. In other words, from O¯gai’s point of view, the Germans had many 
things right, if only they could reject their philosophy and embrace science. 
From Cho¯fu¯’s point of view, the Germans had many things right, if only 
they could reject their material bonds and embrace their philosophy.
How could these two men end up at opposite poles? There were clearly 
many junctures where the two spoke past each other. Cho¯fu¯ was not a sci-
entist, he did not have much interest in science, nor did he see any beauty 
in technological advancement. Although he was a very liberal thinker when 
it came to synthesizing world traditions, his was a conservative mind when 
it came to infrastructure, technology, industry, and the natural sciences. 
In this sense, it was unusual among the Meiji generations of “moderniz-
ers,” most of whom borrowed Western know-how but not religion. O¯gai, 
much more typical, took a mild interest in German philosophy but quickly 
rejected it as a necessary component to modernization. Cho¯fu¯’s embrace 
of Schopenhauer—one that lasted well beyond the letters in Taiyo¯—and 
O¯gai’s dismissal is indicative of this difference in the two men, as is their 
approach to Nietzsche.
Although Nietzsche stopped publishing in O¯gai’s last year studying 
abroad (1888), his shadow over German philosophy was broad. In Cho¯fu¯’s 
case, part of the infl uence was undoubtedly Chogyu¯, who was fond of Nietz-
schean thought, and Cho¯fu¯’s German mentor, Deussen, who was friends 
with Nietzsche. R. Petralia claims that Nietzsche was introduced to Ja-
71. Translation by Dower, “Delusion Mo¯so¯,” p. 423.
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pan largely by Inoue Tetsujiro¯, who brought Nietzsche’s collected works 
back from Europe with him in 1897 and shortly thereafter introduced his 
students—including Cho¯fu¯ and Chogyu¯—to the materials.72 A couple of 
months later, Cho¯fu¯ published “Niiche shiso¯ no yu’nyu¯ to bukkyo¯” in the 
March 1898 issue of Taiyo¯, although the article was anonymous. This is 
commonly identifi ed as the fi rst substantive article on Nietzsche in Japan, 
but Graham Parkes characterizes it as “primarily an exhortation to Bud-
dhists in Japan to respond positively to the infl ux of German philosophy 
by becoming more philosophical.”73 Petralia characterizes it as fl awed and 
misguided, especially in Cho¯fu¯’s interpretation of the Nietzschean concepts 
of the übermensch and the “will to power.” Charitably, Petralia writes, “as 
Cho¯fu¯ was no fool, one can only infer either that his judgment was clouded 
by his zeal for a Buddhist philosophical revival or, more probably, his re-
search into Nietzsche at this time was rudimentary.”74 Given that Cho¯fu¯ was 
only 25 years old when he wrote the article, the latter seems most likely.
Cho¯fu¯’s work on Nietzsche did not stop in 1898—the third open let-
ter in Taiyo¯ (“Futatabi Chogyu¯ ni atauru sho”) comprises a comparison of 
Nietzsche, Wagner, and Schopenhauer. Here the thinking is more sophis-
ticated and detailed. Cho¯fu¯ goes to great lengths to explain Schopenhauer 
and Nietzsche’s work in Buddhist terms, something he could not have done 
had he, like O¯gai, dismissed both Japanese and German traditions early 
on. Nietzsche espoused egoism, which could be seen as an outgrowth of 
the “subjectivity” that so appealed to Cho¯fu¯. Eventually Cho¯fu¯ turns away 
from Nietzsche, though, and returns to Schopenhauer. One can surmise that 
Cho¯fu¯ would have approved of Nietzsche’s rejection of the Christian church 
(much along the same lines as he himself rejected Lutheranism) and his em-
brace of the individual. The split comes when Nietzsche holds the individual 
as the ultimate point of reference, whereas Cho¯fu¯ saw the individual as inti-
mately and importantly connected to the cosmos but not the “center.”
Although Inoue was the major conduit through which Nietzsche was 
introduced to Japan, we also know that O¯gai recorded having received some 
works by Nietzsche from a friend in 1894.75 And, of course, he mentions 
Nietz sche in his Kokura speech, rejecting Nietzsche’s embrace of spiritual-
ity. When he said, “If people . . . seek a synthesis of spirituality, then there is 
no reason for them to be satisfi ed by the current scholarly world in Germany. 
These types of people sympathize with the worshippers of Nietzsche, and 
necessarily pin their hopes on spirituality,” he identifi ed Nietzsche with 
72. See Petralia, “Nietzsche in Meiji Japan,” pp. 213–14.
73. Graham Parkes, “The Early Reception of Nietzsche’s Philosophy in Japan,” in Gra-
ham Parkes, ed., Nietzsche and Asian Thought (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), 
p. 181.
74. Petralia, “Nietzsche in Meiji Japan,” pp. 220–21.
75. Parkes, “Early Reception of Nietzsche’s Philosophy,” p. 189.
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the nonscientifi c, spiritual world. In “Mo¯so¯,” he says he was momentarily 
“intoxicated” by Nietzsche but that he “did not go so far as to seriously ac-
cept discarding the promise of reason.”76 In his Kokura speech, he treats 
Nietzscheism as a fad, one whose fate is unclear but in any event not one 
in which he has any long-term interest. In the introduction to his collection 
of essays titled “Tsukikusa” in 1896, O¯gai mentions Nietzsche only to say 
that, in comparison to the thought of Hartmann and Wundt, his ideas could 
hardly be called philosophy.77 In sum, O¯gai dutifully familiarized himself 
with Nietzsche but did not see him as part of the integral fabric of German 
success nor, by extension, as a part of Japanese modernization.
Conclusion
The yo¯gaku muyo¯ron debate, shortlived as it was, shows us the philo-
sophical and cultural tensions at the forefront at the turn of the twentieth 
century. O¯gai, more than ten years older than Cho¯fu¯, had waded through the 
ideas of Schopenhauer, Hegel, and Nietzsche and rejected them. Or, perhaps 
more accurately, he had deemed them unimportant in the greater scheme of 
modernization. The scientifi c advancements of the West clearly outweighed 
the pessimism of German philosophy, which O¯gai saw as fruitless pontifi ca-
tion. Cho¯fu¯ found his own version of fruitless pursuits in Germany, but it was 
not in the study of Schopenhauer; rather, it was in two different directions, 
the fi rst being the parochial, political, and dogmatic nature of Lutheranism 
and the second being the pedantic world of the German university which, 
according to Cho¯fu¯, had become a petty world in which professors staked 
out their intellectual stances and then defended them to the bitter end.
From a different standpoint, we could say that O¯gai and Cho¯fu¯ shared 
some common ground. Both men felt that German culture had been misap-
propriated in some way. For O¯gai, the blind application of new technologies 
imported from Germany to Japan resulted in waste and poor end results. 
But that was not to say that the technologies themselves were bad, simply 
that they had been improperly applied. For Cho¯fu¯, a man who seems to have 
expected to fi nd a country of Schopenhauers when he fi rst went to Germany, 
the realization that the common German was a provincial and slavish to the 
Lutheran church to the exclusion of any larger integrative philosophy was 
a shock. Again, that was not to say that Germany itself was bad, simply 
that the people had failed to see the wisdom of their earlier philosophers 
(from what he refers to as a golden age) and had improperly interpreted 
Christianity.
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